October 27th - 75th Anniversary of Nehru's Blunders Bleeding India: Kiren Rijiju writes

27th October 2022 marks 75th anniversary of Nehru’s grievous mistakes in integrating Kashmir in India, an error for which India and Indians paid in blood for 75 years. 

• July 1947: Maharaja Hari Singh approaches Congress to accede to India like or princely states. Nehru refuses, saying “he wants more”, a requirement which did not exist in any instrument.
• 20th October 1947: Pakistani raiders inved Kashmir region. Nehru still waffles and does not accept Kashmir’s request to accede to India.
• 21st October: Nehru officially writes to PM of Maharaja Hari Singh, saying it is not desirable for Kashmir to accede to India at that time. This despite Pakistani forces rapidly vancing in Kashmir.
• 26th October: Pakistani forces surround Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh again makes desperate appeal to join India. Nehru still negotiating and waffling with inordinate delay in responding
• 27th October: Kashmir finally accepted into Indian union when Nehru’s demand met on Sheikh Abdullah

Details and Chronology

In 1947, Nehru decided to handle integration of Jammu and Kashmir rar than leaving matter to Sardar Patel, who managed integration of all or Princely States. However, five historical blunders by Nehru during crucial period – 1947 – 1949 not only prevented full integration of J&K but also created a foreground for security threats and anti-India activities that have plagued region for many deces.

Nehru’s First Blunder: Nehru delayed and almost derailed J&K’s Accession

For 75 years, a historical lie has been propagated that Maharaja Hari Singh dired on accession to India. However, Nehru’s speeches and letters indicate that his dismal handling of affairs delayed and nearly derailed J&K’s accession.

Historical Fact 01: Maharaja Hari Singh was willing to accede in July 1947, but Nehru dired

In an dress in Lok Sabha on July 24, 1952, Nehru mentioned that Maharaja Hari Singh h approached India in July 1947 itself. However, rar than formalizing accession, Nehru considered Kashmir a “special case” and sought “something much more”. Nehru deliberately me Kashmir a unique case where ruler was willing to accede, but union government hesitated to finalize accession.

Nehru created “pre-conditions” for accession

Though Maharaja Hari Singh’s acceptance would have been equate for accession as per India Independence Act, Nehru wanted to seek “popular approval”. He consciously me Kashmir an exception and decided to negotiate simultaneously with Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru falsely believed that Abdullah represented dominant popular voice of state. Nehru wanted “popular approval” before proceeding with accession in July 1947.

Despite bloodshed and violence witnessed post-partition, Nehru remained amant on creating pre-conditions for J&K’s accession. He wanted Maharaja to establish an interim government before accession to India. Nehru was amant that Sheikh Abdullah should he interim government. This was clearly stated in a letter to MC Mahajan, J&K’s Prime Minister, on October 21, 1947.

Deliberate delay allowed Pakistan to consolidate its position

Raiders from Pakistan entered J&K on October 20, 1947, and swiftly captured state territory. However, rar than swiftly formalizing accession and sending military support to J&K, Nehru continued to delineate pre-conditions for accession. On October 21, a day after infiltration h started, Nehru vised MC Mahajan that “it will probably be undesirable to make any declaration of hesion to Indian Union at this stage”. reason for Nehru’s reluctance was his pre-condition of an interim government under Sheikh Abdullah’s leership. Rar than learning from his mistake in July 1947, Nehru repeated same blunder. 

This delay proved costly for India, allowing Pakistani forces to consolidate ir position and make furr inros. Providing military support sooner would have allowed forces to prevent furr expansion and territorial capture by Pakistani forces. Even a few days later, on October 26-27, when Pakistani forces h reached barely a few kilometres away from Srinagar, Nehru wasn’t convinced about accepting accession.

Historical Fact 02: Nehru’s Second Blunder: Considering accession to be “provisional”

Nehru created myth that J&K’s accession was conditional and provisional. He deliberately chose to make accession a “special case”.

Cabinet Committee on Defence’s decision on Accession

Cabinet Committee on Defence under Nehru met to consider Maharaja’s request for help after Pakistani forces inved. It was decided that Maharaja would accede to India. Subsequently, union government will “accept this accession provisionally”. Nehru also decided that accession would be “finalized in accordance with will of people”.Even at this stage, Nehru was less concerned with integrating Kashmir in India and more with installing his ‘friend’ Sheikh Abdullah as PM of Kashmir. 

Extract from a note sent to MC Mahajan by Nehru on October 26, 1947:

Historical Fact 03: Maharaja Hari Singh signed same Instrument of Accession as or princely states

Instrument of Accession (IoA) signed by J&K was identical to document signed by rulers of all or Princely States. powers transferred to Union – Defence, External Affairs, and Communication were also like or Princely States. re is no legal ground for J&K’s accession to be special or provisional.

Nehru’s Third Blunder: Internationalization of issues in Jammu and Kashmir

On January 1, 1948, Nehru decided to approach UNSC on Kashmir under Art. 35 of UN Charter. UN decided to intervene and formed UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). UN resolutions on J&K over past deces have weakened India’s position and restrained legitimate response to Pakistani actions. But, importantly, Nehru’s decision to approach UN has been used by Pakistan to justify its claim that J&K was a disputed territory.

This is because Nehru decided to move under Art 35, which deals with disputed land, rar than Art. 51, which would have highlighted Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Indian territory. Moreover, if Nehru h trusted Indian forces and allowed military response to continue, India would have managed to furr push back Pakistani troops and prevented creation of PoJK.

Nehru’s Fourth Blunder: Nehru’s insistence on plebiscite

Contrary to a popular myth, UNCIP’s suggestion on conducting a plebiscite isn’t binding on India. UNCIP itself has accepted this. On August 13, 1948, UNCIP passed a resolution with three parts which were supposed to be completed sequentially.

Part 1: Ceasefire

Part 2: Truce agreement and withdrawal of Pakistani troops

Part 3: Plebiscite

A ceasefire between India and Pakistan was undertaken on January 1, 1949. However, Pakistan failed to withdraw its troops appropriately, which meant that Part II was never fulfilled. UNCIP concurred with India’s aide memoir dated December 23, 1948, which mentioned that India’s acceptance of resolution would not be binding if Pakistan failed to implement Parts I and II. aide memoir mentions that PM Nehru h himself enquired about this in meeting.

Furr, this view was endorsed by UNCIP in a subsequent resolution opted on January 5, 1949.

Despite UNCIP’s clear position on this matter that plebiscite resolution is infructuous, a historical myth has been propagated that India has been bound to conduct a plebiscite. question of plebiscite should never have arisen as Pakistan refused to comply with UNCIP resolutions and did not withdraw its troops. 

Nehru’s Fifth Blunder: Birth of Art. 370

provisional integration and promise of concessions led to Art. 306A (which later became Art. 370). Various drafts of Art. 306A (Art. 370) were prepared after multiple rounds of exchange between N Gopalaswamy Ayyangar and Sheikh Abdullah. eventual draft was a concession and acceptance of various demands me by Sheikh Abdullah. In a discussion on Art. 370 in Constituent Assembly, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, a Muslim representative from United Provinces, questioned extension of special concessions to J&K and termed it discriminatory.